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COMBATING CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: THE BIG QUESTIONS 
 
DAVID HESS* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The last several years have seen a significant rise in the efforts of governments to 
combat the supply side of corruption.  The United States has led the way with criminal 
enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (hereinafter “FCPA”), and 
other nations are now showing signs that they will increase the enforcement of their anti-
bribery laws as well.1  Due to these increased efforts, now is an important time to ask 
some of the big questions in combating corruption.2  By “big,” I do not mean the most 
pressing or controversial questions.  Instead, I mean those questions that cause us to take 
a step back from current FCPA debates and think about what the FCPA—and other 
similar anti-bribery laws—should be trying to accomplish in changing corporate 
behavior.  In short, my big questions relate to understanding why corporations pay bribes, 
what corporations need to do to stop paying bribes (which is not as simple as some may 
assume), and how to encourage corporations to actively fight corruption (that is, to 
combat corruption beyond their organizational boundaries).  
There are, of course, many different perspectives one could take when answering 
these questions.  In this essay, I consider these questions from the perspectives of 
business ethics and corporate social responsibility.  Here, I am using the term “business 
ethics” to refer to both ethical decision making by individuals and the exercise of ethical 
leadership by management, which is managing the organizational context within which 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Business Law & Business Ethics, Ross School of Business, University of 
Michigan. 
1 TRACE INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT (GER) 2013 4, 7-8 (2014), available at 
http://www.traceinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/TRACE-Global-Enforcement-Report-GER-
2013.pdf. 
2 The use of the phrase of “big questions” in this context is inspired by my colleague Steve Salbu’s use of 
the term. See Steven R. Salbu, Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 435, 
437 (2001).  For my reply to some of the “big questions” raised by Salbu, see Thomas W. Dunfee & David 
Hess, Getting from Salbu to the 'Tipping Point': The Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-
Corruption Strategies, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 471 (2001). 
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individuals engage in ethical decision making.3  By corporate social responsibility, I am 
referring to the obligations corporations have to society beyond just following the law.4 
The next section addresses the first question: why do corporations pay bribes?  
This leads to two additional questions: why do employees pay bribes, and when are 
compliance and ethics programs effective in preventing the payment of bribes?  The next 
big question focuses on issues of corporate social responsibility: what should a 
corporation do to combat corruption?  That is, is it sufficient for a corporation to simply 
ensure that its employees do not pay bribes, or should the corporation do something 
more? 
 
II. Why do Corporations Pay Bribes?  
 Generally stated, the literature on combating corruption (and corporate crime 
more generally) tends to take two views of bribe-paying corporations.  First, there is the 
view that the corporation is the rational profit-maximizer.5  This corporation makes the 
decision to pay bribes to win business because the benefits of the new (or continued) 
business outweigh the risks of getting caught paying a bribe and the expected penalty if 
the corporation does get caught.6  The role of the government is to set penalties at the 
right level to encourage corporations to resist the temptation to pay a bribe.7  Under this 
view, the corporation is generally viewed as a “black box.”  This view does not look at 
the motivations of individuals within the corporation, but views the corporation as 
responding to external incentives in a rational, calculated manner.8  In short, corporations 
are viewed as following the law only if the consequences are sufficiently negative, as 
opposed to following the law due to a sense of obligation.9 
 At first glance, company like Siemens appears to be an example of this view.  
Before it paid over $1.5 billion in fines in 2008 for paying bribes, the use of bribery at 
                                                          
3 A Government Accountability Office report defined business ethics as: 
Business actions addressing the CSR concern of business ethics involve 
values such as fairness, honesty, trust and compliance, internal rules, and 
legal requirements.  Among the actions taken to address business ethics 
are incorporating ethics into corporate value and mission statements, 
developing ethics codes, conducting ethics training, and monitoring ethical 
performance. 
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GLOBALIZATION: NUMEROUS FEDERAL ACTIVITIES 
COMPLEMENT U.S. BUSINESS'S GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY EFFORTS 8 (2005), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05744.pdf. 
4 See id. at 5-6.  A Government Accountability Report defined CSR as: “in addition to addressing the 
interests of its shareholders, business should address the interests of its other stakeholders, including 
customers, employees, suppliers, and the local community.” Id. at 5. 
5 Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453 (2003). 
6 Peter May would refer to this type of motivation as a “negative” motivation.  Peter J. May, Compliance 
Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 41, 41-42 (2004).  A negative 
motivation to comply with the law is based on “fears of the consequences of being found in violation of 
regulatory requirements.” Id. at 42.  An “affirmative” motivation, on the other hand is not based on 
coercion, but “good intentions and a sense of obligation to comply.”  Id. 
7 See Malloy, supra note 5, at 453-54. 
8 See id. at 498-99 n.208. 
9 May, supra note 6, at 42. 
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Siemens was wide spread.10  The company paid bribes in multiple different nations, 
utilized secret bank accounts to reduce the risks of getting caught, and one manager even 
claimed to have overseen an annual bribery budget of $40 to $50 million for several 
years.11  Although the German laws had changed to make it clear that bribing foreign 
government officials was illegal, the company continued to pay bribes because, as one 
manager stated, employees believed they had to pay them or else “we’d ruin the 
company.”12  
At the time of the Siemens’ enforcement action, the company was not facing 
significant risk of prosecution because German officials had not taken any significant 
actions to create a fear of enforcement and the United States was just beginning its 
increased enforcement of the FCPA.  However, it is doubtful that greater enforcement 
risk would have changed Siemens’ behavior.  Instead, Siemens likely was an example of 
what Blake Ashforth and Vikas Anand call a “suicidal corruption.”13  That is, a 
corporation that continues down a path that appears to only be leading it to catastrophic 
failure.14  As discussed further below, this occurs because the payment of bribes can 
become such a part of the organization’s normal routine that the organizational members 
will not question the appropriateness of the use of bribes or be responsive to greater 
external threats of punishment.  Instead, the corporation continues down a path that 
would cause any outsider to the organization to wonder, “how did they think they could 
get away with that?”  In short, this shows how, in some cases, the culture of the 
organization—here, one that views the payment of bribes as a normal part of its business 
activity—can be a more powerful influence on behavior than an increased threat of an 
enforcement action.15 
 The second view of a bribe-paying corporation is one that believes that the 
corporation is taking all reasonable efforts to combat corruption (through the adoption of 
a compliance and ethics program), but one or more of its employees (so-called “rogue 
employees”16) still find ways to evade the system and pay a bribe.17  In the United States, 
those corporations that are caught paying bribes but have taken reasonable efforts to 
prevent the bribe payments are eligible for a mitigated sentence under the Organizational 
                                                          
10 The Department of Justice’s sentencing memorandum provides a detailed description of Siemens’ 
corrupt activities.  Department’s Sentencing Memorandum, U.S. v. Siemens et al. (D.D.C. 2008), available 
at www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf. 
11 Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
12 Id. 
13 Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25 RES. ORG. 
BEHAV. 1, 23 (2003). 
14 See id. 
15 See Schubert & Miller, supra note 11. 
16 David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles 
(Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593, 610 (2000); Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 659 (2012). 
17 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 16, at 610. 
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Sentencing Guidelines.18  In addition, under the Department of Justice’s charging policy, 
those corporations may avoid being indicted and instead receive a settlement 
agreement.19  Currently, many commentators are arguing that corporations that have 
implemented a compliance program should receive even greater protection.  In fact, some 
argue that a corporation should have an affirmative defense providing that if one of its 
employees or agents paid a bribe, the corporation cannot be held liable if it can show that 
it took reasonable steps to prevent such payments.20  
There are several reasons behind this increased interest in an affirmative defense 
to violations of the FCPA.  First, the United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010 provides that 
a corporation is strictly liable for a bribe payment by an employee, but it can use the 
affirmative defense of having adopted “adequate procedures” to prevent the bribe 
payment.21  Second, some commentators have framed corporations as essentially victims 
of bribe demands.22  That is, in countries with high levels of corruption, the corporation’s 
employees or agents are constantly faced with bribe requests.  This creates a significant 
risk that, despite the corporation’s best efforts, eventually an employee will break down 
and pay the bribe.23  Thus, when deciding whether to pursue business opportunities in a 
country with high levels of corruption, the corporation is faced with the dilemma of either 
forgoing the opportunity in that country or accepting a significant risk that one of its 
employees may pay a bribe, which then makes the corporation liable under the FCPA.24  
We can all agree that corporations should adopt comprehensive compliance 
programs to prevent employees from paying bribes, and as a policy matter, we should 
find ways to incentivize corporations to adopt and continually improve their programs.  
However, we only want to reward effective compliance programs, and there are 
significant challenges in determining how earnest a corporation was in implementing its 
compliance program.  For example, many commentators have raised the concern that 
corporations intentionally only adopt so-called “paper” programs.25  That is, a program 
                                                          
18 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2014 GUIDELINES MANUAL, CHAPTER EIGHT – SENTENCING OF 
ORGANIZATIONS, INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY (2014), available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-
manual/2014/2014-chapter-8. 
19 US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 56 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf.  
20 See Koehler, supra note 16, at 651-53 (arguing in favor of a compliance defense and reviewing the 
statements of former Department of Justice officials in favor of a compliance defense); Jon Jordan, The 
Adequate Procedures Defense Under the UK Bribery Act: A British Idea for the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 25, 55-56 (2011) (arguing in favor a compliance defense). 
21 Bruce W. Bean and Emma H. MacGuidwin, Unscrewing the Inscrutable: The UK Bribery Act 2010, 23 
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 63-64  (2013). 
22 See Koehler, supra note 16, at 620. 
23 See id. 
24 See Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search of Remedies 
to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 661, 664-67 (2012) (citing evidence showing that corporations 
enforcement of the FCPA reduces U.S. corporations’ investments in countries with high levels of 
corruption). 
25 See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New Ethical Culture 
Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 567-68 (2004); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic 
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-92 (2003); William S. 
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that on paper creates the appearance of attempting to ensure employees follow the law, 
but the corporation is not actually enforcing the program or is finding other ways to 
encourage employees to pay bribes.26  Faulty compliance programs are not necessarily 
due to intentional managerial decisions.  Instead, management may unintentionally 
implement a faulty program, such as by focusing on the internal controls aspects of the 
compliance program but neglecting important aspects of the corporate culture, for 
example.  To satisfy the expectations of outsiders, management may focus on aspects of 
the compliance program that can be easily audited, such as whether it has given its 
employees anti-bribery training, and whether or not the company has an anonymous 
whistle blower program.  
These are two common views that underlie the basic question of why corporations 
pay bribes; either the corporation is intentionally paying bribes due to a cost-benefit 
analysis showing the risks of liability are sufficiently limited, or the corporation is trying 
to prevent bribes but a rogue employee pays a bribe despite those best efforts.  In both 
cases, I believe the issue of corporate culture is not appropriately considered.  For the 
first type of corporation, we need to understand how initial wrongful acts can spiral out of 
control and lead to a situation approaching the suicidal corporation.  Although 
management may (or may not) approve an initial bribe payment, the continued and 
increased use of bribes may grow out of control in the organization.  To an organizational 
outsider, however, it appears that the corporation is making a rational choice to follow a 
corrupt payments strategy and therefore would be responsive to an increased threat of 
enforcement actions.  For the second type of corporation, we need to understand that a 
corporation is not taking reasonable efforts to prevent bribe payments if it is not 
managing its corporate culture.  And according to some recent research discussed below, 
by neglecting its corporate culture, the company’s compliance program can actually 
encourage more wrongful behavior. 
To help understand the role of culture, we will ask another “big” question: why do 
employees pay bribes?  We are especially interested in understanding why otherwise 
ethical employees pay bribes.  Answering this question requires that we look at the 
organizational context in which employees operate.  
A. Why do employees pay bribes? 
The starting point for answering the question of why employees pay bribes is to 
recognize that most employees do not engage in wrongdoing because they are “bad” 
people attempting to get ahead by any means necessary.  Instead, many employees are 
struggling to do their jobs and face significant pressures to get results, which causes them 
to break the rules.  For example, consider a survey conducted by KPMG that asked 
managers to identify the “root causes of misconduct” in their organizations.  The least 
likely cause that managers selected was employees breaking the rules to further their own 
personal interests.27  The more common causes selected by managers included employees 
                                                          
Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1407-
08 (1999). 
26 See Krawiec, supra note 25 at 491-92; Laufer, supra note 25 at 1407-08. 
27 See KPMG FORENSIC, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2013 12, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Integrity-Survey-2013-
O-201307.pdf.  This result is consistent with the prior KPMG Integrity Surveys. Id. at 17. 
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feeling pressure to meet their performance targets and believing that they would be 
evaluated and rewarded based on whether or not they met their targets, regardless of the 
means used to achieve those targets.28  In addition, managers cited employee beliefs that 
the company does not take its code of conduct seriously.29 
The combination of these pressures and employee beliefs can start a process that 
leads to entrenched wrongful behavior within the organization.  This is behavior that 
cannot be corrected simply by requiring additional employee training or layering on new 
internal controls.  Thus, a key lesson from surveys such as KPMG’s is that when 
wrongdoing is observed, we should not view it as an isolated instance, but should 
consider how it relates to prior behavior and how it can impact future behavior if it is not 
appropriately controlled.  The starting point for examining this process is understanding 
why otherwise good people give in to the workplace pressures identified above (which 
are not necessarily pressures to commit wrongful acts, but pressures to meet their 
performance goals) and engage in unethical behavior, such as paying a bribe or ignoring 
obvious red flags that an agent of the corporation is using bribes to obtain business. 
Employees facing, or at least perceiving, these pressures to meet performance 
expectations without regard to the means used or what the company’s code of conduct 
states often find ways to rationalize wrongful behavior.   A rationalization allows an 
individual to commit an act that he or she knows is wrong, but still view him- or herself 
as a good person.30  The employee views the action as an “exception” to a rule, rather 
than as a direct violation of a rule or social norm.  The following phrases capture some of 
the most common rationalizations:  
 “Everyone is doing it.” 
 “It’s not technically illegal.” 
 “I’m not responsible. I had no choice. I was ordered to do it.” 
 “No one is really harmed if I do it.” 
 “I have an obligation to my group.”31 
Employees may utilize rationalizations before they act, or as a way to justify an 
action that they have already taken.32  Either way, these rationalizations can put an 
employee on the slippery slope to additional, and perhaps more significant, wrongful 
conduct.33  When a person is considering an act that she knows is wrong, a rationalization 
helps push her in the direction of committing the act; the rationalization makes it easier to 
take the action.34  In other cases, an employee may not carefully consider their options 
before acting and simply respond to a situation with a wrongful act.  Later, when looking 
                                                          
28 Id. at 12. 
29 Id. 
30 See Ashforth and Anand, supra note 13, at 6. 
31 See generally Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in 
Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 9, 11-14 (2005). For a more complete discussion of how 
employees may rationalize the payment of bribes, see David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption 
and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 307, 319-22 
(2008). 
32 Anand et al., Business as Usual, supra note 31, at 11. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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back on her action, the employee rationalizes that behavior.35  Below is one example of 
how we get into these situations of needing to rationalize behavior after acting. 
When an individual takes the opportunity to carefully consider his or her options 
before acting, social psychologists refer to that as System Two thinking.36  System One 
thinking, on the other hand, is a more automatic decision based on emotions and 
heuristics.37   For example, in one study, women were asked how they would respond if 
during an employment interview the interviewer asked inappropriate questions of a 
sexual nature.38  Sixty-eight percent of the women surveyed stated that they would refuse 
to answer the question and twenty-eight percent stated that they would directly confront 
the interviewer or leave the interview.39  A subsequent experiment that placed fifty 
women in that situation found that no one refused to answer the question, leave the 
interview, or confront the interviewer.40  
Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel explain this difference between how 
interviewees predicted they would act and how they actually acted by using System One 
and System Two thinking.41  When predicting our behavior (the women that were asked 
how they would respond if placed in such a situation), we use System Two thinking and 
consider abstract principles of appropriate behavior.42  When actually in the situation, 
however, the women’s actions were driven not by trying to do the right thing, but by a 
strong desire to get out of the uncomfortable situation.43  The wide difference between 
predicted behavior and actual behavior shows that when predicting our behavior, we 
often do not consider the situation we will be in and the emotions we will be feeling at 
that time.44  One implication from this is that compliance training for employees that only 
focuses on understanding the rules in the company code of conduct will not be as 
effective as compliance training that walks employees through case studies of how this 
situation will arise during their job and the pressures they will be facing.  For our 
purposes, however, this also shows how we get into situations where we find that we did 
not live up to the expectations we hold for ourselves and we need to explain that 
inconsistency.  Rationalizations provide that explanation. 
What is especially problematic about rationalizations—whether they occur before 
or after wrongful behavior—is that they do not allow us to admit our mistakes and 
commit to doing better in the future.  Instead, rationalizations can put us on the slippery 
slope to greater wrongdoing.45  That is, once a person commits that initial wrongful act, 
he or she is at risk not only of continuing that behavior, but also engaging in 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19-30 (2011). 
37 Id. 
38 MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, ETHICAL BLINDSPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 62-63 (2011) (discussing the study: J. A. Woodzicka & M. LaFrance, Real 
Versus Imagined Gender Harassment, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 15 (2001)). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 69. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Anand et al., supra note 31, at 11. 
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incrementally worse and worse acts over time.46  Now that we have an understanding of 
why employees may engage in wrongful acts and may start down on a slippery slope, we 
can examine how such actions may spread throughout the organization. 
One way to understand how wrongful practices can spread throughout the 
organization (or certain departments) is through Ashforth and Anand’s three-stage 
model.47  Stage one involves management encouraging unethical behavior by 
employees.48  This does not have to be done intentionally or explicitly, but can be 
unintentional.49  For example, as discussed above, misconduct is often caused by 
employees feeling pressure to meet performance targets and being rewarded for meeting 
those targets regardless of the means used.  Thus, imagine two employees, A and B.  
Employee A meets his targets through the use of corrupt payments (which he rationalizes 
either before or after acting), and is rewarded for achieving his goal.  Employee B refuses 
to use corrupt payments, misses his targets, and is in someway punished for his failure 
(such as a low bonus, disfavored job assignments, or even termination of employment).  
Through this reward system, management has implicitly approved Employee A’s 
behavior, and sends that message to all other employees who are aware of A’s tactics. 
In stage two of the model, the wrongful behavior becomes embedded in corporate 
practices.50  As other employees see A’s behavior and the rewards he receives, they 
assume that management approves or even actively encourages that behavior.51  In stage 
three, after these practices have spread to a significant number of employees, it becomes 
routine behavior within the organization (or department).52  Employees no longer 
question the use of the behavior and eventually, through a process of desensitization due 
to regular exposure to the behavior, may not even recognize it as an ethical issue.53  The 
end result may be an organization similar to Siemens, with widespread misconduct. 
As the above shows, it is never sufficient for management to claim that they hire 
ethical employees and therefore do not need to worry about those employees engaging in 
wrongful behavior.  Instead, to protect against wrongdoing by individuals and to keep 
any wrongful practices from spreading throughout the organization as described above, 
corporations need a comprehensive compliance and ethics program supported by an 
ethical corporate culture.  In the next section, we discuss the circumstances in which 
those programs are likely to actually be effective. 
B. When do compliance and ethics programs help prevent the payment of 
bribes? 
The goals of compliance and ethics programs are for employees to be aware of 
ethical issues, to make the correct choice when faced with an ethical issue, to seek advice 
when uncertain of how to act, and to feel free to report wrongdoing when it is observed.  
                                                          
46 David T. Welsh et al., The Slippery Slope: How Small Transgressions Pave the Way for Larger Future 
Transgressions, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 114 (2015). 
47 Ashforth and Anand, supra note 13, at 4-15. 
48 Id. at 5-6. 
49 Id. at 6-8. 
50 Id. at 8. 
51 Id. at 9. 
52 Id. at 11. 
53 Id. at 11-12. 
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These goals make it easier for employees to resist rationalizing their behavior and to 
speak up when they see a problem.  As discussed below, the empirical evidence to date 
shows that managing the ethical culture of an organization produces significantly better 
results than a compliance program focused only on detecting and punishing wrongdoing.  
In addition, having a “paper,” or poorly implemented compliance program, can often lead 
to an increase in wrongdoing in the organization.  
Social psychologists studying how organizational contexts influence ethical 
behavior distinguish between an ethical climate and an ethical culture.54  In brief, an 
ethical climate refers to employees’ perceptions of what is or is not appropriate behavior 
in that organization.55  For example, one organization’s ethical climate may be based on 
caring for the well being of customers above other interests, while another organization’s 
ethical climate could emphasize that it is appropriate to focus primarily on how an action 
impacts your own self interests.56  An ethical culture, on the other hand, refers to “those 
aspects of the perceived organizational context that may impede unethical behavior and 
encourage ethical behavior,” such as formal or informal reward systems.57  Not 
surprisingly, most researchers have found that ethical climates and ethical cultures are 
highly correlated.58  Practitioners often refer to ethical climate and ethical culture as 
simply the ethical culture, and, for simplicity, I will do that in this essay as well. 
A recent meta-analytic review of empirical studies on ethical behavior in an 
organizational context confirmed the importance of the ethical culture in influencing 
ethical behavior.59  For the purposes of this paper, what is important to understand is the 
relationship between culture and an organization’s compliance and ethics program.  Not 
surprisingly, the review of the studies showed that simply having a code of ethics does 
not influence employee behavior.60  However, when employees had the perception that 
the company enforced its code of ethics, then unethical behavior was reduced.61  With 
respect to the potential harms of an unenforced “paper” program, the authors state: 
The meta-analysis also found that when perceived code enforcement and 
other organizational variables (e.g., ethical culture and ethical climate) are 
taken into account simultaneously, code existence has a small positive 
effect on unethical behavior.  This suggests that in the presence of these 
other factors, employees can view the mere existence of a code as a negative 
sign that the code represents window dressing only, thus producing a 
cynical response that leads to more unethical behavior.62 
 
                                                          
54 Muel Kaptein, Understanding Unethical Behavior by Unraveling Ethical Culture, 64 HUM. REL. 843, 
846 (2011). 
55 Id. 
56 Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: Meta-Analytic Evidence About 
Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1, 6 (2010); Linda Klebe Treviño et al., 
(Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANNUAL REV. PSYCH. 635, 640 (2014). 
57 Kaptein, supra note 54, at 846. 
58 Id.; Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 56, at 21. 
59 Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 56, at 21. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.; Treviño et al., (Un)ethical Behavior, supra note 56, at 639. 
62 Treviño et al., (Un)ethical Behavior, supra note 56, at 639. 
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Likewise, one study found that when employees perceived that the company’s 
compliance and ethics program was implemented in a manner only to protect the 
organization or top management from blame, then the program was associated with an 
increase in unethical and illegal activity as compared to a company that implemented the 
program in a manner to promote ethical values or even a company that used the program 
simply to detect and punish wrongdoing.63  More recent research shows that when a 
compliance program is adopted to meet external demands, but is not meaningfully 
implemented in the corporation, it causes the program to lose legitimacy with 
employees.64   Due to the lost legitimacy, employees are unlikely to find the compliance 
program valuable or important for their work, and are therefore unlikely to follow it.65  In 
the worst-case scenario, the values behind the program—in our case anti-bribery and 
corruption—may also lose legitimacy, which can result in the compliance program 
actually lowering employees’ consideration of the relevant ethical issues.66 
This decoupling of the adoption of a compliance program from its implementation 
in the organization may not be an intentional decision by management, which is a 
common assumption behind “paper” programs.67   For example, management may decide 
to implement the compliance program in stages over time due to lack of resources.  
However, that incremental approach can create the perception among employees that the 
program is decoupled from actual practice, which can be just as harmful as an intentional 
decision by management to decouple.68  
A recent study led by Linda Trevino looked more specifically at Ethics and 
Compliance Officers (hereinafter “ECOs”) and identified several challenges that ECOs 
face when attempting to establish the legitimacy of the company’s compliance program.69  
If these challenges are too great to overcome, then the program will be decoupled from 
practice, and the problems identified above may occur.70  The challenges these 
researchers found included: 
                                                          
63 See Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works And What Hurts, 
41 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 131, 135-39 (1999). 
64 Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Benham, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship Between 
Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct, 53 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 
1499, 1516-17 (2010); see Tammy MacLean et al., When Organizations Don’t Walk Their Talk: A Cross-
Level Examination of How Decoupling Formal Ethics Programs Affects Organizational Members, 128 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 351, 363 (2015). 
65 MacLean & Benham, Dangers of Decoupling, supra note 64, at 1516-17. 
66 See id.; see also MacLean et al., When Organizations Don’t Walk Their Talk,  supra note 64, at 363 
(“Our findings that decoupling formal ethics programs leads to negative individual-level perceptions on the 
part of organizational members support the existing research that suggests that ethics/compliance programs 
perceived as largely symbolic can do more harm than good.”). 
67 See Patricia Bromley & Walter W. Powell, From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk: Decoupling in 
the Contemporary World, 6 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 483, 484 (2012) (noting that much of the decoupling of 
organizational practices (in general, not just compliance programs) that occurs is likely unintentional). 
68 MacLean et al., When Organizations Don’t Walk Their Talk, supra note 64, at 363. 
69 Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study of Legitimacy Work 
Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 186, 191-94 
(2014). 
70 Bromley & Powell, supra note 67, at 489-93. 
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 Ethics and Compliance Officers having difficulty demonstrating to others 
the effectiveness of the program and the value it adds to the organization. 
 Management believing that they are already ethical and have hired ethical 
employees, and without any immediate crisis facing the company, pushing 
ethics to the “back burner.” 
 Employees at all levels of the company believing that the compliance 
program gets in the way of conducting business effectively.71  
Overall, as these studies show, what matters is not just the presence of a 
compliance program, but how it is implemented and supported by an ethical corporate 
culture.  If it is not implemented appropriately, then the program will have little or no 
effect on ethical behavior, and in some cases, may further the company’s slide into 
becoming a “suicidal organization.”  Thus, when considering the role of compliance and 
ethics programs in combating corruption—whether as a manager implementing a 
program, a member of the board of directors reviewing the compliance program, a 
legislator considering the compliance defense discussed above, or an enforcement 
attorney—these issues of corporate culture must be front and center.  For example, if we 
are considering adding a compliance defense to the FCPA, we need to ask whether that 
defense can be structured in a way that would encourage corporations to focus on these 
issues of corporate culture, or whether such a defense would cause corporations to over-
emphasize those aspects of their compliance program that are most easily audited and, 
due to this lack of focus on implementation, cause the program to be at-risk of losing 
legitimacy with employees.  We also need to consider whether the defense would cause 
corporations to actively seek to improve their programs over time through a culture that 
supports open discussion of ethical issues, or whether it would incentivize corporations to 
work towards creating the appearance that they have state-of-the-art programs and 
attempt to quiet any suggestions by ECOs that certain corporate practices may be 
encouraging unethical behavior or that the program could otherwise be improved. 
C. Summary. 
Overall, the legal community needs to understand why corporations pay bribes.  
In some cases, top management seeks to use bribes to get ahead.  Those corporations 
often have a compliance program that matches best practices.  However, they do not have 
a culture that supports the implementation of that program (and it is important to note that 
a compliance program can also be part of the foundation for building a ethical corporate 
culture).  In other cases, the corporation is trying to do the right thing, but they need 
assistance in managing the compliance program and culture.   And, as stated above, it 
may not be so easy to categorize a corporation as “bad” or “good.”  The “bad” 
corporation at one time may have been a “good” corporation that unintentionally went 
down the three-stage process model described above.  And what appears to be the “good” 
corporation today may head down a similar path if its corporate culture is not 
appropriately managed. 
The above discussion also shows that when looking at why employees pay bribes, 
it is important to look at the organizational context.  Employees face pressures to meet 
their targets, and a culture that does not appropriately support ethical behavior may push 
                                                          
71 Treviño et al., Legitimating the Legitimate, supra note 69 at 191, 94. 
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an employee to commit an act that the employee disapproves of, but finds a way to 
rationalize.  This shows that bribery should not be viewed as an isolated issue, but the 
likelihood of paying bribes is dependent on the ethical culture of the organization.  In 
other words, how managers discuss and deal with any type of ethical issue within the 
organization can have an impact on the culture of the organization, which will influence 
the use of wrongful payments. 
 
III. What should a corporation do to combat corruption? 
The second big question moves beyond a corporation ensuring that its employees 
or agents are not paying bribes and asks what else corporations should be doing to 
combat corruption.  How can we get corporations to think about anti-bribery not just as a 
legal compliance issue, but also as part of their social responsibilities to society?  The 
first part of this essay discussed how corporations should not think about anti-bribery as 
just a legal compliance issue, but as an ethical issue that must be supported by a strong, 
values-based corporate culture.  In this part, we are thinking about anti-bribery as a 
matter of corporate social responsibility (hereinafter “CSR”).  However, as explained 
below, these two aspects of anti-corruption are connected because they should be 
mutually supporting of each other through a corporate culture that has anti-corruption as 
a strong value.  
The first step toward answering our current big question is determining what it 
means for a corporation to be socially responsible.  The term CSR seems to mean 
something different to everyone.  Even for those that would self-identify as working in 
the CSR field, there is no single, universally agreed upon definition of corporate social 
responsibility.72 For our purposes, Business for Social Responsibility developed a 
definition that captures the general idea, stating, “[CSR] is achieving commercial success 
in ways that honour ethical values and respect people, communities and the natural 
environment.”73  The United Nations Global Compact provides some detail to that 
definition by establishing ten universal principles that all corporations should “embrace, 
support and enact, within their sphere of influence.”74  Initially, there were nine 
principles, which covered the areas of human rights, labor rights, and the natural 
environment.  Later, a tenth principle was added, which stated, “[b]usinesses should work 
against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.”75  This principle was 
added after lobbying by those that believed that the other nine principles could not be 
implemented effectively without corporations also committing to the fight against 
corruption.76  The following discussion on labor rights demonstrates this need. 
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A common issue in CSR is the treatment of labor throughout a corporation’s 
supply chain.  Not even twenty years ago, most corporations believed that the use of child 
labor, forced overtime, and unsafe work conditions by their suppliers were the concern of 
those suppliers and outside the corporation’s responsibilities.  Most famously, in response 
to sweatshop allegations at that time, Nike denied responsibility by stating, “we don’t 
make shoes.”77  Now, however, it is generally recognized that corporations do have a 
responsibility to ensure that their suppliers respect the rights of their employees.  To meet 
this responsibility to protect the rights of workers, corporations promulgate policies on 
worker safety and rights that they expect their suppliers to comply with, and then hire 
auditors to determine if those suppliers are in fact in compliance with those policies.  
Corporations then report the auditors’ findings to their shareholders and other interested 
stakeholders in disclosures such as sustainability reports.  
However, as stated in a recent New York Times headline, these audits of 
suppliers’ factories are often “fast and flawed.”78  The auditors typically just run through 
a checklist of items and are easily tricked by factories.79  The factory owners may coach 
employees on how to answer auditors’ questions, send a signal when auditors arrive to let 
child laborers know that they should run out the back door, or they bring in products 
(e.g., clothing and toys) from an unaudited factory and claim that the products were made 
in their factory.80  Overall, some experts believe that even with greater public attention to 
the issue of “sweatshops” and the introduction of factory audits, very little has changed in 
the last twenty years.81 
Underappreciated in this lack of progress is the role of corruption.  In some cases, 
the factory making the apparel or other items can simply bribe the auditor to get a passing 
grade.82  In other cases, the auditor may extort a bribe payment from the factory by 
threatening the factory with a failing grade.83  It is also common for the factory to hire a 
consulting firm in advance of the audit to help the company pass the audit, which is 
accomplished by the consulting company bribing the auditors.84  
In other situations, certain aspects of building safety are beyond the scope of an 
audit, and are the responsibility of local building inspectors, which may also be a corrupt 
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system.85  For example, one of the major CSR news items in 2013 was the collapse of a 
building in Bangladesh that housed factories supplying goods for many different 
multinationals.86  The building collapse caused the deaths over one thousand workers.87   
Corruption at the local government level allowed the building to be built in direct 
violation of building codes (including additional stories), and allowed various other 
safety violations to go unchecked.88  Likewise, commentators have noted that in 
Pakistan—which has seen several hundred workers die in factory fires recently—
inspectors make significant, additional money by allowing factory managers to pay bribes 
to avoid health and safety regulations.89 
In response to the tragedies at these factories, various initiatives have formed, 
such as the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh.90  However, unless 
corruption is brought under control, corrupt payments will prevent these programs from 
reaching their potential, or worse, having any impact at all while still creating the 
impression that some progress is being made.  Overall, whether it is bribes paid to 
auditors or to local government inspectors, corporations are linked to these corrupt 
activities through their suppliers, and this corruption is allowing significant human rights 
violations to occur.  Although corporations may have short-term financial incentives to 
look the other way due to the lower costs of production corruption affords, these actions 
make them complicit in human rights abuses.  In addition, these situations create 
significant risks to the corporation’s reputation, which may offset any short-term cost 
savings.91 
Thus, as to the big question of why corporations should take an active role in 
combating corruption, from the CSR perspective used in this essay, we can see that 
combating corruption is necessary for corporations to meet their other well-recognized 
social responsibilities.  Because of this link between corruption and CSR, corporations 
should integrate combating corruption with its other social initiatives.92  As stated above, 
in many cases, combating corruption becomes solely a legal compliance issue.  
Corporations focus only on ensuring that their employees or agents are not paying bribes.  
However, to “embrace, support, and enact” the first nine principles of the Global 
Compact, combating corruption must mean more than just ensuring that employees and 
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agents do not pay bribes, but must ensure that corruption is not interfering with their 
responsibilities with respect to human rights, labor, and the environment.93  
In Part II, I discussed an ethical corporate culture that supports a compliance and 
ethics program designed to prevent wrongful payments.  Now, we need to consider the 
possibility of the corporation adopting a broader anti-corruption culture that permeates all 
of its activities.  This is a culture that supports both compliance and social initiatives to 
combat corruption.  As stated above, corruption is an issue of CSR; standard mechanisms 
of CSR already include anti-corruption.  For example, sustainability reports require 
corporations to provide disclosures on how they prevent employees from paying bribes.  
Stakeholders that make up the CSR community, such as NGOs and social investors, also 
place pressure on corporations to prevent wrongful payments.94  Corporations must do 
more, however.  We need to encourage corporations to understand how corruption 
impacts their ability to meet their other social responsibilities and work toward ending 
that impediment by proactively combating those corrupt activities.  This is the next step 
in corporations truly developing an anti-corruption culture that supports both ensuring 
that employees do not pay bribes and that the corporation is seeking out ways that it can 
help end the corruption that prevents its other social initiatives from being effective. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 Corporations must combat corruption.  By allowing their employees to pay bribes 
they are contributing to a system that prevents the realization of basic human rights in 
many countries.  Ensuring that employees do not pay bribes is not accomplished by 
simply adopting a compliance and ethics program, however.  This essay provided a brief 
overview of why otherwise good employees pay bribes in the wrong organizational 
environment, and what corporations must focus on to prevent those situations from 
arising.  In short, preventing bribe payments must be treated as an ethical issue, not just a 
legal compliance issue, and the corporation must actively manage its corporate culture to 
ensure it supports the ethical behavior of employees. 
This essay also argued that corporations must do more than just ensure that their 
employees do not pay bribes.  Corporations should work to reduce the impact of 
corruption in their efforts to meet their social responsibilities in the areas of human rights, 
labor, and the environment.  Overall, corporations must adopt a culture where the anti-
corruption mindset permeates all of their activities.  This includes both internal actions 
that support employees’ anti-corruption efforts and external actions, including a 
willingness to work with other organizations on initiatives to combat corruption, whether 
those organizations are in the private, civil, or public sector. 
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